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Are Un-Registered Hedge Funds More Likely to Misreport 
Returns? 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to introduce an empirical finance analysis of the relationship between 
misreporting behavior in hedge funds at the return level and registration as an investment adviser 
with the SEC, a law that has been enacted, overturned and re-enacted in the last decade. We 
hypothesize that hedge funds that are not registered with the SEC will be more likely to 
misreport returns so that a fund will seem as if it is generating positive returns more often than 
not. We test our hypothesis on the return level by conducting several statistical tests and 
regression models on hedge fund monthly returns that fall within a certain monthly reported 
return bin width. We do not find compelling evidence to support our hypothesis that funds not 
registered with the SEC will be more likely to misreport returns, although we do find links 
between certain hedge fund characteristics and misreporting behavior that is supported by the 
existing literature. We check the robustness of our study according to a number of parameters, 
including, bin widths of misreporting returns, as well as specifications controlling for fund size, 
hedge fund style, incentives, backfill bias, survivorship bias and other robustness checks. 
 
Keywords: hedge fund, regulation, misreported returns, SEC, registered adviser, law and finance 
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Introduction 
  In this paper, we seek to analyze the link between the instance of hedge fund return 
misreporting and its relation to hedge fund regulation in the United States by asking, “Are Un-
Registered Hedge Funds More Likely to Misreport Returns?”  
  The hedge fund industry is one of the most elite, as well as controversial industries in 
finance, and total assets under management of hedge funds have grown to enormous proportions. 
Hedge funds are thought to have played a crucial part in the most recent financial crisis. They are 
increasingly at the forefront of financial markets, and certain hedge fund managers have the pull 
to move markets. As hedge funds have become integrated into the American financial system, 
and engrained in the minds of the American public as one of the main players in Wall Street, 
they have also enjoyed a period of relatively low regulation when compared to other investment 
vehicles, which has drawn the criticism of many regulators and politicians, alike. 
Currently, hedge funds, as private entities, are not required to disclose nearly the same 
amount of information as other similar investment vehicles, such as mutual funds and pension 
funds, although they still have to meet certain requirements pertaining to record-keeping and 
anti-fraud measures. In 2004, the SEC enacted a law that required hedge fund advisers managing 
more than $25 million and having more than 15 investors to register as an investment adviser, 
which entailed disclosing aspects of the fund to the SEC. However, in June 2006, the rule was 
overturned (Williams, 2009). In 2008, the US economy took one of the worst downturns in 
history and many were questioning if more regulation was needed on Wall Street. As a result, 
regulators analyzed all aspects of the US economy, and in July 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform Act was passed. The Dodd-Frank act was passed to reduce risks to the financial system 
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so that a crisis of that magnitude could be prevented, and many provisions in the law subject 
financial institutions other than banks, such as hedge funds, to greater regulatory oversight. One 
aspect of the law essentially reenacted the 2004 SEC registration law by requiring hedge fund 
advisers controlling more than $150 million in assets and having more than 15 clients to register 
with the SEC, as well as provide information about the fund. Information such as assets under 
management and trading positions of the registered hedge fund were deemed necessary so that 
the SEC could examine the impact that the funds had on the systemic risk of the financial 
system, as well as to prevent hedge fund fraud (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, various years). As the 
industry faces increasing regulation in the aftermath of the financial crisis, hedge funds will most 
likely have to adapt and find ways to meet the increased cost of meeting compliance standards. 
This has set the stage for an intense argument about whether these regulations will ultimately 
harm the state of the hedge fund industry.  
It has been shown extensively in the literature that many hedge funds engage in return 
smoothing and return misreporting to improve the overall performance of the fund for various 
reasons, including attracting potential investors and preventing investor outflow. A method of 
measuring hedge fund monthly return misreporting was developed from the research conducted 
by Bollen and Pool (2008 & 2009). In their paper they outlined a theory as to what factors might 
contribute to the instance of hedge fund misreporting and the range of returns that should be 
considered for a study on misreporting. The bin width of returns they deemed significant to 
screen from misreporting are in the range, -0.58% to 0.58%. One can consider values in this 
range to be either marginally negative or marginally positive; therefore, hedge funds will be 
more inclined to report marginally positive returns (0 < monthly return ≤ 0.58%) as opposed to 
negative returns in order to make their overall returns more attractive to investors and to prevent 
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fund outflow. By analyzing the amount of marginally positive returns relative to marginally 
negative returns, a proxy for misreporting can be inferred if there are significantly more 
marginally positive returns in the bin width of -0.58% to 0.58%. This is the basis for our study 
and how we will measure misreporting at the return level. Due to lack of regulation, we 
hypothesize that funds that are not registered with the SEC will have a tendency to report slightly 
positive returns in order to improve their performance. 
This study is relevant is many ways, because it looks at the effects of one aspect of under- 
and over- regulation. Is regulation of hedge funds worthwhile and valuable? Also, how much 
regulation is needed before it becomes a hindrance to the industry? After the wake of the 
financial crisis, many regulators, politicians and citizens have been pushing for heavy regulation 
of the most important financial institutions. Proponents for increased regulation believe hedge 
funds should be examined carefully under the eye of the SEC and other financial regulators 
because of how integrated they have become in our financial system. On the other hand, 
opponents to increased hedge fund regulation believe that hedge funds should not be regulated 
because they drive economic and financial market growth. They believe that new regulations 
might have a negative effect on hedge fund returns, as they would need to commit more capital 
in meeting reporting requirements. This study seeks to find out if registration with the SEC is 
worthwhile in preventing the instance of misreporting, and adds to the growing literature of 
hedge fund regulation, as well as hedge fund fraud. 
In this study, we find that hedge funds that are not registered as investment advisers are 
not more likely to misreport returns than hedge funds that are registered as investment advisers, 
using various statistical techniques outlined later in the paper. Thus, we fail to accept the 
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alternative hypothesis. In other words, we do not find significant evidence that the registration 
with the SEC effectively prevents hedge funds from misreporting their returns.  
In the remaining part of this thesis, we summarize the relevant literature, and how our 
study takes from and advances the existing literature. Afterward, we discuss the development of 
our hypothesis, which is derived from the literature. The following section concerns the data set 
and derivation of the sample, as well as summary statistics and return histograms showing the 
return distribution. In the empirical analysis section, we discuss how the hypothesis was tested, 
including tables of statistical t-tests run on hedge funds that are either registered or not registered 
with the SEC. We also include a regression analysis to control for several characteristics of 
hedge funds, such as asset under management and fee structures. Finally, we conclude the thesis 
with a discussion about our findings, as well future direction for other studies in this field. 
Literature Review 
Our hypothesis stems from much of the existing literature concerning hedge fund 
regulation, especially in the United States. The first paper that sets the stage for our topic looks at 
the issue of the agency problem, first researched by Jensen and Meckler (1976), which sought to 
explain the issue of why and how there is an occurrence of selfish actions on the part of the 
entrepreneur who is investing the savers’ capital. In our case, the entrepreneur would be the 
hedge fund manager who misreports returns while the savers are the investors. This paper first 
highlighted the compensation and incentive problems that can cause these kinds of agency 
problems that may lead to misreporting of hedge fund returns. The paper also helped to outline 
why there is a need for disclosure in the capital markets and summarized much of the previous 
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literature on the matter. It sets the theoretical framework for disclosure and agency problems, the 
basis of our hypothesis. 
Another important paper is a study conducted by Liang (2003), which started to question 
the accuracy of hedge fund returns. The paper delves into many aspects of hedge fund returns; 
however, the most important finding in his paper to our hypothesis is the link between audited 
funds and return discrepancies. They find that audited funds have smaller return discrepancies 
than unaudited funds, and that auditing makes a difference in data quality. The study sheds light 
on hedge funds manipulating returns in the industry and provided a basis for further research into 
the matter. 
More literature relevant to our study is the work done by Bollen and Pool (2008) on a 
way to screen for fraud in hedge funds. Their first goal was to assess whether the returns reported 
by a hedge fund was enough to develop an accurate test for fraud, however, they found that their 
test was only accurate around 35% most of the time. Another goal of theirs was to develop a way 
to detect if a hedge fund was engaging in conditional return smoothing, meaning that they are 
more likely to report positive returns in order to balance out the negative returns. Their research 
helped lay the groundwork for the type of statistical tests and inferences that our study will be 
utilizing. Their subsequent paper (Bollen and Pool, 2009) delved further into detail about the 
“Misreported Returns” variable that is at the crux of our hypothesis. Building from their previous 
paper, the researchers found a significant discontinuity around the pooled distribution of monthly 
hedge fund returns. One would expect a continuous curve distributed around zero in a bin range 
of marginally negative and marginally positive results, however, Bollen and Pool found that 
there are significantly more reported small gains than small losses. This indicates that fraud 
could be occurring in the hedge funds that report slightly positive returns because the managers 
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want to show that even though the returns are not robust, they are at least positive. This is the 
same way we will be able to tell if hedge funds are misreporting returns, by making a statistical 
inference that a hedge fund that reports a slightly positive monthly return is more likely to be 
misreporting returns. They also found that these results were the same across live and dead 
funds, as well as among different types of funds. An important part of their study that bolsters 
their hypothesis is that this discontinuity is not observed using bimonthly returns, indicating that 
the single-month discontinuity in returns is partly caused by some misreporting. They also 
established a range in monthly returns that will prove essential to our study; the range they found 
to be essential in conducting their study on misreported returns is between -0.58% and 0.58%. 
They also checked for robustness in their study by analyzing misreporting in the ranges between 
-0.48% and -0.48% and -0.68% and 0.68%. 
 The work of Dai and Cummings (2010) is important to this area of research because it 
finds important links between hedge fund misreporting, hedge fund characteristics and different 
hedge fund regulations in varying countries. The focus of their paper is on the instance of 
misreporting across different types of hedge funds and different regions of the world. Their paper 
analyzes the way hedge fund regulations and hedge fund characteristics across different countries 
have a significant effect on the instance of misreporting. Things such as minimal capital 
requirements, restrictions on location, distribution on service providers and wrappers have a 
significant effect on hedge fund misreporting. Their variable for hedge fund misreporting, a 
marginally positive return dummy assigned a value of 0 if the return was greater than or equal to 
-0.58% and equal to 0 and 1 if the return was greater than 0 but less than or equal 0.58%, was 
based on the discontinuity in monthly return distributions that Bollen and Pool outlined in the 
aforementioned studies.  They also showed that misreporting affects capital inflows and that 
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there is an added economic benefit to misreporting returns. This is probably the most closely 
related study to our hypothesis testing and provided a great framework to construct our study.  
In 2009, Brown, Liang, Goetzmann and Schwarz outlined the different ways that 
registration with the SEC could be beneficial to investors and how costly it was to hedge funds. 
In 2004, the SEC increased the different ways they could regulate hedge funds and required 
some managers to register with the SEC as investment advisers. In 2006, the rule was 
overturned. They tested whether this type of reporting was redundant and found that it was if the 
investors were well informed rational capital market participants. For the most part, the type of 
information that the SEC was requiring hedge funds to disclose or register could be obtained by 
other means and it did not help investors in identifying problem funds. This is important to our 
hypothesis because it provides a backdrop about regulation and registration with the SEC. 
Furthermore, it provides a theoretical reason as to why we could not accept the alternative 
hypothesis that un-registered hedge funds will be more likely to misreport returns. 
PWC has a special website that goes into detail about the different details associated with 
hedge fund regulation and taxation, although we were mostly concerned with the former. It 
outlines the progression of several different bills that have come up in order to regulate hedge 
funds. There is a large movement within congress, especially after the financial crisis, to try to 
get more information from hedge funds and regulate them further to try to identify any sources of 
systemic risk within the markets. The information that the SEC is particularly interested in 
obtaining is the amount of assets under management, borrowings, off-balance sheet exposures, 
counterparty credit risk exposures, trading and investment positions. 
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These papers are the major studies in the field that we deemed important enough to 
summarize. They not only provided a backdrop to our study, but also helped us identify key 
variables and how to control for different hedge fund characteristics within the study. Most of the 
studies also have regression models that provided guidance when we tested our hypothesis. 
Hypotheses Development 
Null Hypothesis H0 = There will be no difference in misreported returns between hedge funds 
that are not registered with the SEC and hedge funds that are registered with the SEC as 
investment advisers. 
Alternative Hypothesis H0 = Hedge funds that are not registered with the SEC as investment 
advisers are more likely to misreport returns, by way of having an increased number of 
marginally positive returns.  
The development of the hypothesis stems from the idea that if a hedge fund is not 
required to disclose as much information, or is not subject to SEC oversight, than those hedge 
funds will be more likely to misreport returns. We hypothesize a correlation between hedge 
funds not registered with the SEC and the tendency to misreport monthly returns.  
Data and Sample 
The main database used in our empirical analysis was supplied by Lipper/TASS, a major 
hedge funds data vendor. In the database, there are 13 different styles of hedge funds. Of these 
styles, the five most common in terms of months of reported returns were: fund of funds 
(24.76%), long/short equity hedge (21.54%), event driven (17.03%), managed futures (9.57%) 
and equity market neutral (7.54%). Other useful information contained in the data is the 
 Are Un-Registered Hedge Funds More Likely to Misreport Returns  
 
11 
inception date of the fund, the report date, the time period that the fund reported returns, the 
lockup period, the estimated assets under management, as well as other variables regarding fee 
structure and investment strategy. To avoid survivorship bias, our sample period covered January 
1994 through July 2013 for both live and dead funds. We restricted our sample to hedge funds 
domiciled in the U.S. The data also did not include hedge funds whose estimated assets were not 
in US dollars. We also excluded monthly returns for which the hedge fund did not report 
estimated assets. Furthermore, we excluded the first 18 months of reported returns by each hedge 
fund, to account for backfill bias. This left us with 31,207 hedge fund return observations and 
2,154 hedge funds in the months between January 1, 1994 and July 31, 2013. We considered 
only the hedge fund monthly returns within the [-0.58%, 0.58%] range for our sample. To check 
for robustness, we also created a sample of monthly returns in the [-0.68%, 0.68%] range, as well 
as the narrower [-0.48%, 0.48%] range. To account for inflation, the consumer price index was 
used to set the estimated total assets of each fund on the reported return date to 2012 dollars. 
Dummy variables were used in order to perform the regression analysis. A lockup period dummy 
variable was created and a hedge fund return observation was either assigned a 1 if the fund had 
a lockup period and 0 if the fund did not have a lockup period. Similarly, if the fund had a yearly 
redemption, the return observation was assigned a value of 1 and 0 if the fund did not. For 
example, if the fund was a fund of funds, it was assigned a variable of 1 and 0 if it was not a fund 
of funds. Finally, the most important variable used in our study, the marginally positive return 
dummy, was created. If the return observation for the fund had a return greater than 0 but less 
than or equal to 0.58%, the fund return observation record was assigned a value of 1. If the return 
observation for the fund had a return greater than or equal to -0.58% or less than or equal to 0, 
the fund return observation record was assigned a value of 0. The 1 values for this variable are 
 Are Un-Registered Hedge Funds More Likely to Misreport Returns  
 
12 
referred to as the marginally positive return dummy throughout our paper and is our proxy for 
misreporting. Registration with the SEC is a variable equal to 1 if the fund is registered as an 
investment adviser with the SEC and 0 if the fund is not registered. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 displays two histograms of raw monthly returns for sample funds from the database for 
registered and un-registered funds. Registered funds’ monthly returns are displayed in Panel A, 
while un-registered funds’ monthly returns are displayed in Panel B. Tails are omitted past 0.1 in 
order to highlight differences in marginally positive and marginally negative returns around zero. 
Marginally positive returns greater than 0 but less than or equal to 0.58% are highlighted by a 
dark-shaded bar in both graphs, showing the large jump from marginally negative to marginally 
positive returns. 
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Figure 1 Discontinuity in monthly hedge fund returns around zero at a bin width of 0.0058 
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Table 1 Summary statistics and comparison of means tests 
 Registered Not Registered Difference 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median T-test 
Fund Characteristics 
    
   Adjusted AUM 
(millions) 
 
   Management Fee 
    
   Performance Fee 
 
   High Water Mark 
 
   Leveraged 
 
   Yearly Redemption 
   
   Lockup Period 
 
Fund of Funds 
 
 
$169.95 
 
 
0.0129 
 
0.1402 
 
0.7985 
 
0.4996 
 
0.1230 
 
0.4619 
 
0.3426 
 
 
$62.24 
 
 
0.0215 
 
0.2 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
. 
$155.35 
 
 
0.0133 
 
0.1669 
 
0.6802 
 
0.5654 
 
0.122 
 
0.4113 
 
0.2142 
 
 
 
$43.79 
 
 
0.01 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 
0.0006 
 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.4148 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
No. Of Observations 6421 24786  
 
Table 1 provides the mean and median for the important variables used in the study and the difference in 
means (t-test) for each variable, showing p-values for each. The data comprise of 31,207 return 
observations and 2,154 hedge funds from the period of January 1994 to July 2013. In this table, fund 
returns outside the range of (-0.58%, 0.58%) are excluded. 
Figure 1 displays two histograms of raw monthly returns for sample funds from the 
database for registered and un-registered funds. Registered funds’ monthly returns are displayed 
in Panel A, while un-registered funds’ monthly returns are displayed in Panel B. Marginally 
positive returns greater than 0 but less than or equal to 0.58% are highlighted by a dark-shaded 
bar in both graphs, showing the large jump from marginally negative, which are to the left of the 
dark bar, to marginally positive returns. Both panels show a sharp discontinuity in the 
distribution at zero. The frequency of returns just below zero is significant lower than expected, 
whereas the frequency of returns just above zero is significantly higher than expected. These 
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histograms help depict how our study measured misreported returns by showing the difference in 
the marginally positive and marginally negative dummy. 
Table 1 shows the mean and median for several of our key variables from the subsample 
of return observations that fall between -0.58% and 0.58% for both registered and un-registered 
hedge funds. A difference of means test is also depicted to the far right in the table, showing if 
the difference in means of registered and un-registered hedge funds is significant. The data set 
has 31,207 return observations and 2,154 hedge funds from the period of January 1994 to July 
2013. From the table, it is clear that there is a stark difference in the mean and median for 
adjusted assets under management (AUM) in both registered and un-registered hedge funds. For 
example, the mean value for adjusted AUM for registered hedge funds is $169.95 million and the 
median value is $62.24 million, resulting in a difference of over $100 million. It is also clear that 
there is a significant difference in the means of all the variables of registered and un-registered 
funds except for the yearly redemption dummy variable because the p-values are around 0.0000. 
Another note regarding the table is the much larger number of observations for funds that are not 
registered (24786) in contrast to registered hedge funds (6421). These variables were used for the 
regression analysis. 
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Empirical Analysis 
Our main model is as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐸𝐶 + 𝛽2 × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
Since registration of a hedge fund with the SEC means greater transparency of the fund 
for investors and more regulation, we seek to infer an interaction SEC registration variable and 
the marginally positive return dummy variable. We conducted this test by first running t-tests on 
the marginally positive return dummy variables on the return level for both registered and un-
registered hedge funds. This was done to find an initial significance in misreporting between 
registered and un-registered hedge funds. The results are listed below in Table 2 and discussed 
later in the section. To test for robustness, we also repeated this testing at the 0.48% and 0.68% 
bin widths. 
In our regression analysis, we tested our hypothesis and further cemented our findings by 
controlling for other fund specific factors, listed in the summary statistics table above, that are 
important in hedge fund misreporting according to the literature, including fund AUM, 
performance and incentive fees, yearly redemption lockup period and several different 
investment strategies. A regression analysis was performed in Microsoft Excel by setting the 
marginally positive return dummy as the dependent variable and the SEC registration variable as 
the independent variable. The log and log-squared of the AUM, management fee, incentive fee, 
high watermark variable, leverage variable, lockup period variables and several hedge fund 
strategy dummy variables were also set to the independent variables in the regression analysis. 
To test for robustness, we also repeated this testing at the 0.48% and 0.68% bin widths. 
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Table 2 Univariate tests of the marginally positive return dummy 
t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances 
 Statistic Registered Not Registered 
Mean 
0.5819* 
0.5899** 
0.5963*** 
0.5822* 
0.5910** 
0.5985*** 
P(T<=t) one-tail 
0.4816* 
0.4377** 
0.3681*** 
P(T<=t) two-tail 
0.9631* 
0.8754** 
0.7361*** 
 
Table 2 shows the univariate testing that was performed on the marginally positive return dummy variables of the 
registered return observations versus the marginally positive return dummy variables of the un-registered return 
observations. It should be noted that one asterisk signifies the t-test performed at the 0.0048 bin width, two asterisks 
signify the t-test performed at the 0.0058 bin width and three asterisks signify the t-test performed at the 0.0068 bin 
width. The p-values at the one and two tail levels are also listed, showing no significance at either level. 
 We performed a t-test on the sample means of the marginally positive return dummy 
variables for both registered and un-registered hedge funds using Microsoft Excel. Table 2 shows 
the t-test means and significance for two-samples with unequal variances. It should be noted that 
one asterisk signifies the t-test performed at the 0.0048 bin width, two asterisks signify the t-test 
performed at the 0.0058 bin width and three asterisks signify the t-test performed at the 0.0068 
bin width. At the 0.0058 bin width, the mean of the marginally positive return dummy variable 
for registered hedge funds is 0.5899 and the mean of the marginally positive return dummy 
variable for un-registered hedge funds is 0.5910. One can see that the mean of the variable that is 
the proxy for misreporting is higher in funds that are not registered with the SEC, in line with our 
hypothesis; however, the difference in the means is not significant, showing a p-value of 0.4377 
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at the 0.0058 bin width. These results do not support our alternative hypothesis and a regression 
analysis was performed to investigate the t-test results further. 
Table 3 Regression analysis of hedge fund return misreporting at different bin widths 
 
0.0048 bin width 0.0058 bin width 0.0068 bin width 
Intercept 0.5107 
(0.0009) 
0.5119 
(0.0006) 
0.4969 
(0.0002) 
SEC Registered -0.0047 
(0.5423) 
-0.0063 
(0.3702) 
-0.0080 
(0.2251) 
Log AUM 0.0156 
(0.7013) 
0.0163 
(0.6812) 
0.0222 
(0.5311) 
Log2 AUM 0.0000 
(0.9873) 
0.0000 
(0.9853) 
-0.0004 
(0.8668) 
Management Fee -0.0115 
(0.0259) 
-0.0125 
(0.0085) 
-0.0122 
(0.0054) 
Incentive Fee 0.0013 
(0.0209) 
0.0012 
(0.0217) 
0.0009 
(0.0592) 
High Water Mark -0.0038 
(0.6110) 
-0.0002 
(0.9758) 
0.0009 
(0.8908) 
Leverage -0.0049 
(0.4458) 
-0.0067 
(0.2538) 
-0.0077 
(0.1595) 
Lockup Period -0.0071 
(0.2820) 
-0.0008 
(0.8976) 
-0.0011 
(0.8375) 
 
No. of Observations 26,075 31,207 36,217 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.97% 1.17% 1.23% 
 
Table 3 shows the values obtained from the regression analysis that was performed on the sample. The dependent 
variable is the marginally positive return dummy in the 0.58% bin width during the period from January 1994 – July 
2013. The independent variables include the SEC registration variable, log and log-squared of the adjusted AUM of 
the fund, management fee, incentive fee, the high water mark variable, the leverage variable, and the lockup period 
dummy variable. Please refer to the Appendix for detailed definitions of these variables. P-values are reported in 
parentheses and the number of observations and adjusted R-squared values are reported at the bottom of the table. 
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We performed a regression analysis on the sample at a bin width of 0.0058, as well as 
0.0048 and 0.0068 to make our findings more robust. The dependent variable is the marginally 
positive return dummy. The independent variables include the SEC registration variable, log and 
log-squared of the adjusted AUM of the fund, management fee, incentive fee, the high water 
mark variable, the leverage variable, and the lockup period dummy variable. P-values are 
reported in parentheses and the number of observations and adjusted R-squared values are 
reported at the bottom of the table. From this table, we can see that the SEC registration variable 
is negatively associated with the marginally positive return dummy, in line with our hypothesis 
that un-registered funds are more likely to misreport returns; however the findings are definitely 
not significant at either confidence level. The p-value at the 0.0058 bin width is 0.3702, similar 
to what we found for the t-tests. From the table, we can also see that management fee is 
negatively associated with the marginally positive return dummy and that incentive fee is 
positively associated with the marginally positive return dummy. Both are significant at the 95% 
confidence level, with p values less than 0.05. It is also clear that high water mark, leverage and 
the lockup period dummy variable are negatively associated with the marginally positive return 
dummy as well, with both being significant at the 99% confidence level. The adjusted R-squared 
values for the regression analysis is very small, indicating a loose correlation. 
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Conclusion 
 This paper outlines a finance analysis that was performed on the link between SEC 
registration as an investment adviser and fund return level misreporting. Consistent with 
previous literature (Bollen and Pool, 2009; Cumming and Dai 2010), we show in Figure 1 a 
discontinuity around returns just below and above zero. In this way, hedge fund managers are 
incentivized to misreport monthly returns that are marginally positive in order to smooth their 
performance and attract investors. 
After conducting several statistical tests, we failed to accept the alternative hypothesis 
that un-registered hedge funds are more likely to misreport returns because of inconclusive 
evidence in both the univariate and multivariate analyses. This means, by the design of our study, 
that hedge fund registration is not an accurate predictor of whether the hedge fund monthly 
returns are marginally positive, a proxy for misreporting.  To make the study more robust, we 
performed the same analysis on two other ranges of monthly returns, bin widths of 0.48% and 
0.68%. The tests showed slight variation between the different ranges of monthly returns, there 
was still no significant evidence to accept the alternative hypothesis. The data could signify a 
couple different things. First, it does not seem that registration with the SEC has any significant 
effect on the misreporting of monthly returns of hedge funds. As one hedge fund trader said, 
“Hedge fund registration with the SEC is easy. It only takes an hour and you only have to do it 
once a year.” This could mean that registration with the SEC is not a big deal or time-consuming 
for hedge funds and hedge funds will find a way to misreport returns somehow. Although this 
doesn’t mean that the information collected from the registration process it not valuable to the 
SEC. They might use the data to screen for fund externalities and systemic risk. Another idea of 
why alternative hypothesis was not accepted was because the hedge funds that we looked at in 
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the study were only domiciled in the US, and perhaps the increased regulation does not have an 
effect on reporting because we have very efficient markets here comprised of sophisticated 
investors. Other studies looked at hedge funds around the world and saw that differences in 
regulation had an impact on return manipulation. In countries with less developed markets, 
regulations might have a significantly greater impact on preventing misreporting and other 
fraudulent activities.  
Some of the statistical results in this paper are consistent across past literature, showing 
links between misreporting and certain hedge fund characteristics like AUM, fee structures and 
investment style. The methodology used is most consistent with the studies conducted by 
Cumming and Dai (2010). The evidence from this study is inconclusive to support the alternative 
hypothesis that hedge funds not registered with the SEC are more likely to misreport returns. 
Further investigation is needed into the link between regulation and misreporting in the United 
States. Future directions for the study include performing the study at the fund level or 
identifying different kinds of misreporting flags. 
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Appendix   
Table 4 Variable definition table 
Variables Definition 
Fund Misreporting 
 
   Marginally Positive 
Return Dummy 
 
 
 
 
  Rate of Return 
 
 
A dummy variable equal to one for monthly returns between 0 and 
0.0058, and equal to zero for returns between −0.0058 and 0. This 
cutoff is selected based on Bollen and Pool (2009). (The sensitivity of 
this dummy variable to specifications at the 0.0048 and 0.0068 cutoff 
points is assessed in the regressions.) 
 
The monthly rate of return of the hedge fund on the reporting date in 
decimal format 
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Fund Regulation 
 
   Registered Investment 
Adviser 
 
 
 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund is registered as an investment 
adviser with the SEC  
 
 
Fund Characteristics 
 
   Adjusted AUM 
 
   Management Fee 
    
   Performance Fee 
    
 
   High Water Mark 
 
 
   Leveraged 
 
 
   Yearly Redemption 
 
   
   Lockup Period 
 
Fund of Funds 
 
   Long/Short Equity Hedge 
   
 
   Event Driven 
 
 
   Equity Market Neutral 
 
 
   Managed Futures 
 
 
   Convertible Arbitrage 
 
 
   Multi-Strategy 
 
 
 
The fund’s assets adjusted in 2012 US dollars 
 
The fixed fee in percentage for management compensation 
 
The carried interest performance fee in percentages for management 
compensation 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund utilizes a high water mark as 
an incentive to perform well 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the fund utilizes leverage techniques 
 
 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if capital redemptions are possible only on 
an annual basis 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund has a lock-up provision 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is a fund-of-funds 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is categorized under 
long/short equity hedge 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is categorized under event 
driven 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is categorized under equity 
market neutral  
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is categorized under 
managed futures 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is categorized under 
convertible arbitrage 
 
A dummy variable equal to one if the fund is categorized under multi-
strategy 
 
 
  
